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THE GENIUS OF THE 1898 BANKRUPTCY ACT
David A. Skeel, Jr.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The year 1 898 was a watershed year in American history. It is
the end of 1 998 as I write , and one of the most widely reviewed
books of the year is entitled simply 1 898.1 From th� vantage point
of one century later, 1 898 is still the year when Teddy Roosevelt and
the Rough Riders stormed San Juan Hill in Cuba. The famous
charge not only assured Roosevelt a permanent place in the Ameri
can imagination, but it also marked America ' s coming of age as a
nation. After a comparatively provincial start, America' s e conomy
had become one of the world's most important, and America's mili
tary exploits in Cuba sen,ed as no tice that America intended to be a
serious player on the world stage.
Although 1 898, the book, has nothing to say about bankruptcy,
the year 1 898 was also a crucial one for bankruptcy. For the first
century of the nation's existence, there had never been a stable
bankruptcy law.
Under its constitutional authority to enact
"uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy,"2 Congress had passed
three different bankruptcy laws-in 1 800, " 1 84 1 , 4 and 1 867. 5 But
the life of each was, to borrow from Thomas Hobbes, "nasty, brut-

'' Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. The author wishes to thank Bruce
Markell and the edi tors of the Bankruptcy Dn-elopments]ournal for their i nvitation to write
this Article and to Brad Hanse n , Todd J. Zywicki , and participants at the Creditors' and Debt
ors' Rights section of the 1999 AALS annual meeting for helpful comments. This Article is
pan of a larger project e n titled Bankruptcy Lawyers and the Politics o[American Bankruptcy
1

'
1

See

DA.VID TRA.XEL , 1898: THE BIRTH OF THE AMERJCA:-.1 CENTL'RY ( 1998).

U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8.

See Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 [hereinafter 1800 Act].
Dec. 19 , 1 803, ch . 6 , 2 Stat. 248.

repealed by

See Act of Aug. 1 9, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 [hereinafter 1841 Act],
:VIar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614.

repealed by Act

'

;

See Act of Mar. 2, 1 867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 5 1 7 [hereinafter 1867 Act],
ofjune 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99.
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ish, and short."" Then in 1 898, the clouds suddenly cleared (well,
not so suddenly, as we shall see) . Congress passed the 1 89 8 Act, and
the rest is history. The 1 89 8 Act endured, and bankruptcy law h as
expanded-rather than contracted or been repealed-ever since.
There is a standard story about the nineteenth century bank
ruptcy laws that were j ust mentioned, and the story goes like this.'
Under ordinary circumstances, there was not enough political sup
port to keep a permanent b ankruptcy law in place. But the nation
was periodically thrown into turmoil by deep economic depressions.
These depressions provoked loud cries for bankruptcy legislation.
Congress responded to this pressure by passing b ankrup tcy laws, but
it then repealed the laws when the depression passed and support
for federal bankruptcy regulation receded.
This story is true enough, as far as it goes, but it leaves several
puzzles unanswered. First, it does not tell us why 1 89 8 was so spe
cial . How did the 1 898 Act emerge , and why did it survive the post
Act backlash that toppled each of its predecessors? Second, why did
the Act take a form so different from the English b ankruptcy system
that developed under apparently similar circumstances across the
Atlantic Ocean. In contrast to the pro-creditor, administrative Eng
lish approach , the 189 8 Act favored debtors ' interests in many re
spects and assumed that the parties and their lawyers, rather than
government officials, would run the bankruptcy system .
This Article attempts to address each of the puzzles described
above , and thus to pinpoint the "genius" of the 1 89 8 Act.8 Simply
put, the Article argues that the genius of the Act came from the in
teraction of creditor groups and federalism prior to the Act and the
influence of the new bankruptcy bar after the Act.9 This analysis
'' The 1 800 Ac t lasted over three years, the 184 1 Act lasted less than two years, and the
1867 Act lasted approximately eleven years. For the elates of repeal, see supra notes 3-S.
7

The theme of the story, along with the importance of secti onal rivalries to the bank
ruptcy debates, is the central m otif in CH.-\RLES WARREN, BANKRCPTCY I!\ U:\ITED ST.-\TES
HISTORY (1935). It also figures prominently in the other most prominent book-length ac
COlll1 ts of bankruptcy h istory. See F. REGIS NOEL, HISTORY OF THE BA:\KRCPTC\' L.->.\1' ( 1919);
PETER
DEBT,

j. COLD-lA:\, DEBTORS .-\:\0 CREDITORS I:\ A:VIERIC:A: lNSOL\'E!\CY, T:viPRISO:\\IE"\T FOR
.-\"\D B.-\"iKRCPTC:Y 1607- 1 900 ( 1 974) . For a good survey of bankru p tcy histor·y in article

form, see Charles Jordon Tabb,

The Histoq of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United Sutes,

.A.� I B..>."i KR. hsT. L. REv. S (1995) .
·'

3

As those familiar with the corporate law li terature will recogn ize, the author bor
rolvecl this term from Roberta Romano. See ROBERTA ROM.-\i\0, THE GF."iiL·s OF A:VIERIC.\"J
CORPOR.\TE L\\1' ( 1993)
''
Playing an important supporting role was an unusually long period of Republican
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begins by describing the puzzles posed by the 1898 Act and then
considers the reasons it proved to be special.

II. Two PUZZLES OF THE 1898 ACT
As mentioned at the outset, the standard story of American
bankruptcy history is a tale of bust and boom . On this view, we have
the D epression of 1793 to thank for the 1800 Bankruptcy Act; and
the Panics of 1837, 1857, and 1893 to thank for the 1841, 1867, and
1898 Acts. Once the first three acts h ad done their initial work and
economic conditions improved, Congress repealed the federal legis
lation and left insolvency law to the states.
To say that the early bankruptcy laws responded to economic
distress is, of course, to vastly oversimplify the politics of their pas
sage . The 1800 Act was enacted and the n repealed in the midst of a
sustained struggle between the Federalists and the Jeffersonian
Democrats over the future direction of the nation .10 The Federalist
vision of a national economy based on trade rather than agriculture
won out with the passage of the 1800 Act, only to meet a quick
death when Jefferson was elected. The debates that led to the next
act, in 1841, were in many respects the most memorable , with im
portant speeches by Daniel Webster, Henry Clay, John Calhoun ,
and Thomas Benton spicing up proceedings that once again served
as a referendum on the national economy.11 The 1867 Act was en
acted in the aftermath of the Civil War, and Southerners' outrage at
its implementation by "carpetbagging" federal judges would figure
prominently in the debates that ultimately produced the 1898 Act.
On most legislative issues, politi cal differences are resolved
over time , with one of the competing positions, or some stable
compromise , winning out. Yet it took a hundred years for Congress

control at the turn of the century.
"'
For an excellent account of this struggle as it influenced the eady bankruptcy de
bates, see DRE.\1' R. MCCOY, THE. ELuSIVE REPUBLIC:: POLIIIC-\L ECO!'\O:VIY IN jE.FFERSO:'-JIA'-J
A_'viERJC:.-'. l 78-84 ( 1980).
"
E\·en at the end of the centw-y, in the debates O\·er the

1 898 Act, both proponents

and opponents of bankruptc: reform repeatedly quoted the speeches Webster and Clay gave
in 1840.

Proponents emphasized their

su p po r t

for federal bankruptcy legislation, whereas

opponents focused on their support for an amendment that would have limited the act to
voluntary bankruptcy only. St>e, t>.g.,
(describing vVebster's support

for

25

COM'.. REc.

federal

2878 (1 893)

bankruptcy);

31

(statement of Rep. Brosius)
CO'-JC.

REc.

1940

( 1898)

(statement o f Rep. Bailey) (stating that both Webster and Calhoun voted i n favor o f the Clay
amendment that would ha,·e eliminated the involuntary bankruptcy provision in 1841).

324

BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS jOURNAL

[Vol. 15

to fall into line on bankruptcy. There are several reasons why the
instability lasted so long. Most frequently mentioned is the long
standing geograph ical conflict over federal b ankruptcy l aw.
vVhereas Northeastern lawmakers long advocated bankruptcy legis
lation as essential to developing a national economy, Southern and
Western lawmakers resisted, due to their constituents' fear that
bankruptcy would threaten farmers' property and livelihood.12 The
sectional differences roughly tracked, though not completely, the
opposing views of the Federalists/Whigs ( and later, Republicans) ,
most of whom supported bankruptcy, and the Jacksonian Demo
crats, who did not.
While these conflicts ensured that the bankruptcy debates
would be sharply contested, what made matters worse was that l aw
makers held not j ust two , but three distinct views on b ankrup tcy
( and a wide range of additional variations) .'� Some lawmakers
would vote for bankruptcy so long as it was strictly voluntary ( th at is,
a debtor could file for b ankruptcy but his creditors could not throw
the debtor into bankruptcy involuntarily) . Others insisted on a
"complete" bankruptcy law, with both voluntary and involuntary
bankruptcy. And a final group opposed bankruptcy al together.
The competing views exacerbated the difficulty of settling on a
single, consistent approach to bankruptcy.''' Congress enacted a
" As a concession to this sentiment, proponents of bankruptcy excluded farmers from
involuntary bankruptcy, so that farmers could invoke the bankruptcy la1vs but could not be
forced into bankruptcy by creditors. But farm advocates still were not satisfied. Even if farm
ers were technically immune, they argued, Eastern wholesalers could file involuntar-y peti
tions against the small retail merchants who sold crucial supplies to farme1·s. The merchants'
trustees would then bring pressure on the merchants' farm debtors, with devastating effects
on farmers. See 25 CONC. REC:. 2873-74 (1893) (statemem of Rep. Kyle) (hypothesizing
about vulnerability of farmers if merchants forced into bankruptcy) .
''
For a more detailed account, see D avid A. Skeel, Jr., Bankrupccy L:JHyers and rhe
Shape of American Bankruptcy Law, 67 FORDHAM L REv. 497, 502-503 ( l 998).
"
The three views were unusually difficult to reconcile because there was no obvious
relationship among them. One might think that complete bankruptcy would belong at one
pole, voluntary in the middle, and opposition to bankruptcy at the other pole. But this was
not the case. Many lawmakers who supported complete bankruptcy, for instance, viewed a
voluntary-only law as even worse than no bankruptcy legislation at all.
Drawing from social choice theory, the author has argued elsewhere that the multiplic
ity ohiews reflected a voting perversity referred to as "cycling." See Skeel, s upra note 1 3 . In
the absence of stable ("single-peaked") legislative preferences, legislators shifted back and
forth among the three options until the forces considered in Pans III and IV finally ushered
in a new era of stability. For an argument that current bankruptcy legislation has often in
volved partial defections from the overall bankruptcy system for the benefit of narrow interest
groups, see Susan Block-Lieb, Congress' Temptation to DeFect: A Political and Economic
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"complete" (although principally voluntary) bankruptcy law in
1 84 1 , which after being repealed, was followed by more than twenty
years without any bankruptcy law. Congress next passed the 1 867
Act, which again included both voluntary and involuntary bank
ruptcy. In the bankruptcy debates of the 1 880s and 1 890s, the three
views continued to jostle for supremacy/" until the 1 898 Act settled
the debate in favor of a "complete" bankruptcy system .
The first and most obvious puzzle raised by the 1 898 Act i s why
1 898 was the year that the century-long game of musical chairs fi
nally came to a stop. Why did "voluntary-only" and "no bankruptcy"
disappear as perceived alternatives?
Commentators have had surprisingly little to say about this
puzzle . The only explanation one finds in the existing literature is
that the expansion of commerce in the United States had made
federal bankruptcy legislation inevitable . 16 On this view, proponents
of an agrarian vision for America were the opponents of bank
ruptcy, whereas the advocates of commerce supported it; and by the
end of the nineteenth century, America had become a commercial
nation once and for all.
Focusing on the emergence of America as a commercial nation
is a useful starting point, but it tells us little about how expanding
commerce translated into a permanent bankruptcy law (and tells us
even less about narrower questions such as why 1 898 was the magi
cal year, rather than , say, 1 890 or 1 895). To better understand the
significance of 1 898, we will need a more particularized account of
the political components of the 1 898 Act.17
Developing a more precise account is even more crucial to ex
plaining the second great puzzle of the 1 898 Act: its overall shape.
Although it was promoted by creditors, the 1 898 Act was in many
respects strikingly debtor-friendly-most obviously, in its generous
discharge provisions.1s Another striking feature of the 1 89 8 Act was

Theory ofLegislati1·e Resolutions to Financial Common Pool Problems, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 80 1

( 1 99 7).
�-.

The House passed a voluntary bill (the "Bailey Bill") in 1 894, and the Senate Bill (the

"Nelson Bill") that was reconciled with its very different House counterpart (the "Henderson
Bill") permitted involuntary bankruptcy only in limited circumstances, such as fraudulent
behavior by the debtor.
1"

For a particularly explicit adoption of this view, see Richard C. Sauer, Bankruptcy Law

and the J'vfawring ofA.merican Capitalism, .55 OHIO ST.
10

"

L.J. 2 9 1 ( 1 994).

See icl.

James Olmstead referred to the overall effect of the 1 898 Act as a 'jubilee" for debt-

326

BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS jOURNAL

[Vol. 1 5

its minimalist administrative structure. The principal ban kruptcy
officials, referees and trustees, were paid on a fee basis, not by sal
ary, and had only limited powers. 19
This second puzzle, the general con tours of the 1 89 8 Act, is
best appreciated by contrast to the English b ankruptcy framework
that developed at roughly the same time. Throughout the n ine
teenth century, American lawmakers paid close atten tion to devel
opmen ts across the Atlantic . English bankruptcy law was an obvious
point of reference, because of both America's h istory as an English
colony and England ' s status as a preem inen t world power.
In one sense, England was the picture of stability by compari
son to the American bankruptcy debates. Whereas the United
States went long periods without federal bankruptcy, England had
national ban kruptcy laws on the books throughout the nineteenth
cen tury. But bankruptcy law was a source of considerable dissatis
faction in England, as in the United States, which prompted a series
of reforms over the course of the century. A very brief overview will
give the flavor, and underscore the remarkable differences between
English and American ban kruptcy law.
In 1 83 1 , Parliament enacted a bankruptcy law that introduced
"officialism " to English bankruptcy law.�0 Previous bankruptcy acts
had largely been creditor collection devices, invoked and pursued
by individual creditors. Often referred to as "Lord Brougham ' s Act"
after the reformer most influential to its enactment, the English
Bankruptcy Act of 1 83 1 replaced creditor control with a govern
mental official who would administer the bankruptcy system .
Rather than individual creditors, the bankruptcy official would be
the principal overseer of the bankruptcy process.
Although initially viewed as a success, the 1 83 1 Act had come
under attack by the 1 850s. ( Both the complaints and the principal
proponents for reform will sound very similar to developments i n
America, a s we will see in the next part. ) The principal proponen ts
for change were business organizations that had begun to form in
ors i n a much-cited attack on the Act. See James Monroe Olmstead, B ankruptcy: a Commer
cial Regulation, 1.5

HA.RV.

L. REv.

829, 843 (1 902). The legislative compromises on discharge

are discussed in more detail in Part IV, infra.
"
For a discussion of the shift from salaried

to

fee-based officials, see infra notes 54-.58

and corresponding text.
''' The overview that follows is drawn from the lengthy discussion in V. MARKHAM
LESTER, VICTOR!.\!'\ lNSOLVE!\CY: BAi'\KRUPTCY, lMPRISO:--IME:\T FOR DEBT, .-\:--10 COMPANY
WI"iDI!\:G-UP I'i NI!'.:ETEENTH-CDiTCRYENGLA"iD 41-.59 ( 1 99.5).
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the mid-nineteenth century.21 The most frequent complaint was
cost. Administrative expenses, such as the cost of compensating the
bankruptcy officials, ate up much of the bankruptcy estate, leaving
little to distribute to creditors.22
In response to these concerns, creditors ' groups drafted and
began lobbying for a creditor-run system. Rather than a govern
mental official, the creditors' proposal called for a creditor
appointed trustee ( the "assignee") to oversee the bankruptcy proc
ess. With the English Bankruptcy Act of 186 1, the creditors' groups
agreed to a compromise reform .23 Buoyed by favorable reports
about the success of the creditor-run system in Scotland, creditors'
groups then achieved a more complete victory in 1869. With the
English Bankruptcy Act of 1869, "officialism" gave way to creditor
control.�"�
To the surprise of many, Englan d ' s Bankruptcy Act of 1869
proved to be a complete failure. In cases with small amounts at
stake , creditors had little interest or incentive to participate .2" M any
observers believed that debtors were not being scrutinized carefully
enough, and there were loud complaints about a variety of abuses.2';
In 1883 , the pendulum swung once again . Although many creditor
groups continued to lobby for a creditor-run system, the Bankruptcy
Act of 1883 brought a return to "officialism. " The Bankruptcy Act
of 1 883 authorized the Board of Trade to appoint an official re
ceiver to conduct most of the administrative functions of the bank
ruptcy case.27 Unlike its predecessors, the Bankruptcy Act of 1 883
endured and established what are still the basic parameters of Eng
lish bankruptcy law.
The English system bears little resemblance to the framework
"

See, e.g., id. at 64-65 (discussing reforms proposed by merchants in 1840s).

The or

ganizations that figured most prominently in the debates of the late 1850s and 1860s were the
National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, an organization of businessmen,
politicians, doctors and lawyers and the Associated Chambers of Commerce.

33.

"

See id. at 123-

See id. at 133.

The English Bankruptcy Act of 1861 gave enhanced powers to the creditors' assignee,
but omitted reforms to the appellate structure that creditors had sought. See id. at 143-44.
''
See id. at 133-63.
'"

'-'-'

See icl. at 173-74.
See icl. at 182-83.
See icl. at 195-97 (describing a Board of Trade bill that \vas subsequent1y enacted); sec

also icl. at 204-203 (proffering adjustments to bill as it was enacted limiting some power of the

Board of Trade) .
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Congress adopted for the United States in 1898. The wide ranging
authority of the official receiver-who personally investigates each
debtor (generally without debtor's counsel present) , oversees the
appoin tment of a trustee, and makes recommendations to the
court-gives the English system a pervasively governmental and
administrative character. E nglish ban kruptcy also is far less gen er
ous to debtors than its American counterpart. A debtor who files
for bankruptcy in E ngland is subject to searching scrutiny, and
courts routinely delay the debtor' s discharge for a period of several
os
years.·'
Thus, shortly after E ngland adopted a heavily administrative
approach to bankruptcy, America moved in precisely the opposite
direction . American bankruptcy cases would be staffed by part-time
officials, leaving the process largely to the parties and their lawyers.
Unlike the almost punitive British system, the 1 89 8 Act was repeat
e dly defended as pro tecting the "honest but unfortunate" debtor.
The question, and the second great puzzle of 1898 , is: why?
Ill. BEFORE THE ACT: CREDITORS At'ID FEDERALISM
To understand why the 1 898 Act proved permanent, and why
American bankruptcy law traveled down a different path than its
British counterpart, we need to consider two time p eriods: the pe
riod leading up to the Act, and the years immediately after. In be
tween, and connecting the "before" and "after," was an unusually
long period of Republican control .
The single most important in terest group agitating for ban k
ruptcy legislation was unsecured creditors, particularly wholesal e
firms; and the most important development was t h e emergence o f
business organizations t o lobby for their interests. By 1 878, when
Congress repealed the 1 867 Act, chambers of commerce and boards

"

For a recent account of these features of English bankruptcy law, see Douglas G.

Boshkoff, Limited, Condicional, and Suspended Disch arges in Anglo-American Bankrupccv
Proceedings, 1 3 1

U. P.-\. L. REv. 69 (1982). American reformers have periodically sought to

introduce English-sryle administrators and closer scrutiny of debtors to American bankruptcy
law. An active, early proponent of this approach was William Douglas, who emphasized the
\irtues of a careful study of debtors in a series of depression era articles. See William Clark et
al., The Business Failures Project-A Problem in !'vlech odology, 39 Y.-\LE Lj. 101 3, 1 015-16

( 1 930) (stating that in England, "[t]he antecedents of failure are delved into with marked
thoroughness ... "). These reforms have invariablv failed in the United States, however, clue
to the political factors we will consider in the remainder of the Article.
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of trade had begun to form in numerous localities.29 Because these
businessmen felt underprotected by state debtor-creditor laws,
which often permitted debtors to favor relatives and other preferred
creditors, the members of these groups had a strong, unified inter
est in federal bankruptcy legislation. 30
In 1 88 1 , these business organizations hired Judge John Lowell
Massachusetts
to draft proposed legislation.31 At the first of three
of
conventions h eld by their bankruptcy umbrella organization, the
National Convention of Representatives of Commercial Bodies, the
creditors enthusiastically endorsed Judge Lowell's handiwork.32 The
Lowell bill was introduced in Congress in 1 882, and its supporters
persuaded the Senate to pass it in 1 884, but that was as far as the
legislation went. In 1 889, the creditors went back to the drawing
board and hired Jay Torrey, a lawyer and later one of the Rough
Riders,:1:1 to revise their proposed legislation. As with the Lowell Bill ,
the creditors gave their vigorous approval to Torrey's draft at a
meeting of the National Convention of Representatives of Commer
cial Bodies-this time in 1 889.'14 Torrey tirelessly campaigned for
the Torrey Bill for the next nine years, until Congress finally en
acted it in revised form in 1898.:;5

'"

For a detailed discussion and statistical analysis of the emergence of these business

organizations and a description of their influence on the 1 89 8 Act, see Bradley Hansen,
Commercial Associations and the Creation of a National Economy: The Demand for Federal
Bankruprcy Law, 72 Bus. HIST. REv. 86 ( 1998) .
'"

The treatment of preferential transfers was a heated issue throughout the bankruptcy

debates. Whereas lawmakers sympathetic to federal bankruptcy legislation echoed creditors'
insistence that preferences must be prohibited, some opponents of bankruptcy defended
preferences.

In their view, debtors had a moral obligation to prefer creditors such as family

members over other creditors.

See 17 CONC. R.Ec. 5134 ( 1886) (statement of Rep. Brown)

(defending preferential payments as "debts of honor"); see also Robert Weisberg, Commer

cial Morality, th e lvferchanc Character, and the Hisro1y of the Voidable Preference, 39 ST,\N.
L. REV. 3 ( 1986) (characteri:;,ing the debate as reflecting confusion about the morality of
commerce and bankruptcy).
"'

For O\"erviews of the legislative history described below, see, for example, WARREN,

supra note 7, at 128-4 1 .
''
See Hansen, supra note 29, at 98.
·''

Perhaps inevitably, the limited prominence Torrey had in the nation at large came

much less from his tireless promotion of bankruptcy legislation than from his exploits in
Cuba. See Hansen, supra note 29, at 98.
''
See Hanson, supra note 29, a t 99.
,.,
Both proponents and opponents of the Torrey Bill referred with some regularity to
his etlons on behalf of the bill.

See, e.g. , 30

CoNe. REc. 628 ( 1 897)

(statement of Rep.

Stewart) (stating, as a critic of the bill, "Mr. Torrey is a very sharp lawyer.
ployed for a long time by interested parties").

He has been em
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What exactly were creditors looking for in a ban kruptcy law?
Like their counterparts in England, American business groups
wanted bankruptcy to be run by creditors, not a government offi
cial.3ti They believed that a debtor's assets should be distributed by a
trustee chosen by the creditors rather than a permanent official .37
To the extent the law required new officials to act, in effect, as
judges, these officials were given a set salary to preven t some of the
abuses of the 1 867 Act.3H Substantively, creditors were adamant that
the legislation prohibit preferential transfers, and that it include i n
voluntary bankruptcy. They also wanted the law to be relatively
tough on debtors, particularly those who had defrauded their credi
tors.
If creditors had been the only force in the b ankruptcy delibera
tions, the 1 898 Act might h ave looked much like E nglish bank
ruptcy law.39 But a cluster of opposing forces, unique to the United
States, had a crucial restraining effect on the creditors' aspirations.
These will be referred to as pro-debtor forces,10 which stem from the
overlap between state and federal government in American lawmak
ing ( an d the influence of the states even in the federal sphere ) ,
"

An 1 882 speech by Senator Ingalls, who had proposed a bankruptcy bill that would

vest bankruptcy authority in the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts, underscores the a,
finities between American and English creditors' groups. Ingalls contended that the Lowell
Bill was drawn from England's Bankruptcy Act of 1 869, and emphasized the complaints in
England about that legislation. See 1 4 CONG. REC. 38, 39 ( 1 882).
manager for the Lowell Bill, did not denv the connections.

Senator Hoar, the floor

Instead, he insisted that the

weaknesses of the English law had been addressed by the Lowell Bill. See id. at 40.
"

See generally id. at 38-42 (statements of Sen. Ingalls and Sen. Hoar) (debate between

Senator Ingalls and the tloor manager of the original Lowell Bill, Senator Hoar, as to whether
creditor control would be more effectual than judicial intervention).
''

The 1 867 Act required debtors (or the bankruptcy estate) to pay set fees for filing

and for a variety of tasks, such as notifying creditors.
were needlessly multiplied by bankruptcy officials.

Many observers believed that the fees

In introducing the Lowell Bill, Senator

Hoar extolled its reliance on salaries rather than fees as one of the most important advances
of the Bill. See id. at 147. Although the bill did not initially specifY the amounts of the o£1i
cials' salaries, proponents quickly inserted numbers: supervisors would receive $3000 per year
and registers would receive $2000 per year. See id. at 43.
The author does not suggest that creditors were the sole influence on the English
bankruptcy law.

To the contrar-y, Lester suggests that the inf1uence of creditor interest

groups had waned by the time Parliament passed the Bankruptcy Act of 1 883, which set the
tone of English bankruptcy law for the next century. See LESTER, supra note 20, at 208. The
point, instead, is that the bill that American creditors proposed, the Lowell Bill, looked much
more like the English system than the legislation that finally passed in 1 898.
'"

\:Vhether a lenient bankruptcy law genuinely ''favors" debtors is, of course, debatable.

since creditors will respond by adjusting credit terms.

But the lawmakers who voiced the

\·iews described in the text saw their position as unequiYocally pro-debtor.
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1e d era1'1sm. "41
lo ose 1y as "i:
The most obvious effect of federalism was to give voice to pro
debtor views that might not otherwise have played a substantial
role.42 The agrarian and populist movements of the nineteenth cen
tury were largely local in n ature , but the influence of farmers at the
state level quickly translated into n ational influence through the
states' representatives in Congress.43 In the b ankruptcy debates,
populist rhetoric surfaced in attacks on the h arshness of the credi
tors' proposals, and complaints that farmers and small merchan ts
would be ruined. The Torrey Bill was frequen tly linked to North
eastern sympathy for the gold standard, which populists attacked as
devastating for their debtor constituen ts.14
Closely related to agrarianism and populism was the states'
rights movement. Throughout the nineteenth century, advocates of
states' rights had criticized b ankruptcy reform as federalizing issues
that would otherwise be regulated by the states. Two particular
concerns were the amount of litigation that would be shifted from
state to federal courts and the specter of a vast new government bur)
reaucracy.
"

Federalism plays a similarly prominent role in Mark Roe's political account of the

separation of ownership and control in publicly held U.S. corporations.

See MARK J. ROE,

STROr\G MA;'\AGERS, WEAK OWNERS 45-46 ( 1994).
"

As \\ill become clear below, the factors referred to as "federalism" include both ide

ology and interest group acti\ity, as they were shaped by the sharing of authority between
Congress and the states in the United States. For a more general discussion of interest group
influence, see Dznid A. Skeel, Jr., Public Choice and the F11ture of Public-Choice-Influenced
Legal Scholarship, 50 VAND. L. REv. 64 7 ( 1997).
11

One of the best accounts of agrarianism and populism is RICHARD HOFST\DTER, THE
Ac;E OF REFORM: FRO:VI BRYAN TO F.D.R. ( 1955). Local movements are particularly influential
in the Senate, because each state has two senators, regardless of population. See, e.g., }\:VIES
WILL'\RD HURST, TI-lE GROVVTH OF AMERICAN LAW : THE L-'\W MAKERS 44-45 (1950). Moreover,
state legislatures selected the states' senators throughout the nineteenth century. See TocldJ.
Zywicki, Senators and Special InteresL'i: A Public Choice Analysis of the Seventeenth /Lmencl
ment, 73 OR. L. REV. 1007, 1008 n.6 ( 1994) (citing U.S. COr\ST. art I, § 3, cl. 1 (amended in
1913 with the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment)). Rural movements such as
agrarianism and populism were aided in the House by subtle factors such as lawmakers' tar
diness in reapportioning Congress to ref1ect increasing urbanization in the late nineteenth
century. See HOFSTADTER, supra, at 116-17.

"

A good illustration, complete with a populist history of recent U.S. monetary legisla

tion, is a speech by Representative Gunn in 1898.

See 31 CONG. REC. 1911-13 ( 1898)

(statement of Rep. Gunn).
"
' The apprehension about expanding the federal bureaucracy was shared even by
many lawmakers who supported federal bankruptcy legislation. See, e.g., 14 CONG. REc. 168

( 1882) (statement of Rep. Bayard). Concern for state authority had also been a major reason
the first three federal bankruptcy laws did not include corporate bankruptcy.

Opponents
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Both of these factors-populist concerns for farmers and small
merchan ts, and opposition to federalization-were reinforced by
concerns (also shared by creditor groups) about the cost of the
bankruptcy process. Even more than widespread allegations of
fraud, the costs of administration had left a bad taste in lawmakers'
mouths after the 1867 Act. Over and over, opponents complained,
and proponents conceded, that debtors' estates had been eaten up
by administrative fees that compensated the officials handsomely
but left little for anyone else. 46 Although cost is a concern in any
bankruptcy regime, it raised particularly serious problems in the
United States due to the natio n ' s geography (which lawmakers con
trasted to the compact geography of Englan d) and the decentral
ized n ature of the courts that would implement bankruptcy law. ''
A final aspect of federalism is the role of banks. Federalism
gives unusual clout to local b an ks, which have long parlayed their
influence at the state level into legislative protections.'18 Given their
interest in commerce, one might expect banks to h ave played a
prominent, supportive role in the struggle for n ational bankruptcy
legislation . In actuality, they did not. 19 One reason for this, alluded
to by lawmakers on both sides, was that local banks often were the

including corporations i nsisted that, since states regulated other aspects of corporate law,
states should also regulate corporate insolvency. For a detailed discussio n on this issue , see
Da\id A. Skeel, Jr. , Rethinking the Line Benveen Corpora te Law and Corporate Bankruptcy,
7'2 TEX. L. RE V . 4 7 1 ( 1994).
'" Examples of such complaints are legion in the legislative h istory. For a relatively
thorough discussion of the fees charged under the 1 867 Act and a defense of the proposed
legislation as solving the problem, see 28 CONG. REc. 461 2 ( 1 896) ( state ment of Sen. Burton )
( '" [T) h e crowning evil of the law o f 1 867 was the enormous fee bill which the register i n
bankruptcv and the assignee in bankruptcy were enabled to tax up against the estate of a
bankrupt") . See also Letter from Attorney General in Compliance with Senate Resolution of
Feb. 24, 1 8 78, S. EXEC. D oc. No. 1 9 ( 1 874) (reporting bankruptcy costs i n the United States
under the 1 867 Act) .
"
See, e.g., 25 CONG. REC. app. at 539 ( 1 893) ( statement of Rep. Lane) (contending
that costs of the English system are 40% of all assets, and due to the diffe rences i n geography,
the costs in the U.S. would approach or exceed 75% of assets) .
'' The United States has had an unusually fragmented ban king system at least as far
back as the National Bank Act of 1 863, which both reflected and reinforced the su·ength of
local banks. Local banks are a key factor in Mark Roe 's influential poli ti cal analysis of U.S.
corporate governance. See ROE, supra note 4 1 .
"' Unlike merchants and other businesses, banks rarely appear i n the lists o f memorials
for (or against) bankruptcy legislation. A list of supporters of bankruptcy included i n the
Congressional Record in 1 898, for instance, includes only one or two banks among the hun
dreds of individuals and firms included. See 31 C O N G . REc:. 1 904- 1 90 7 ( 1 898) ( lists appended
to statement of Rep. Grosvenor ) .
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beneficiaries of the preferential prebankruptcy transfers that pro
ponents of federal bankruptcy were so anxious to prohibit."0 In ad
dition, both local and n ational banks were less exposed in bank
ruptcy than other creditors, because they could lend on a secured
status. As a result, even national banks had less to gain from bank
ruptcy legislation than might otherwise have been the case ;"1 and
many local ban ks were more sympathetic to the populist opposition
to bankruptcy than to the creditors who supported it.
As economic conditions deteriorated in the 1 890s, many of the
lawmakers who were sympathetic to farmers and small merchan ts
rallied behind proposals for bankruptcy law that included only vol
untary bankruptcy. 52 But creditors' groups were deadset against a
voluntary-only bankruptcy law, which many saw as benefitting only
'3
debtors and, therefore, worse than no ban kruptcy law at all ." If
creditors' groups wanted to pass a ban kruptcy law that included
both voluntary and involun tary bankruptcy, however, they would
have to respond to at least some of the concerns of the lawmakers
sympathetic to farmers and small merchants. And this is precisely
what they did. The give-and-take between creditors ' groups and the
forces spawned by federalism can be seen in three important areas.
The first is the administrative structure of bankruptcy. From their
earliest proposals, creditors advocated a strikingly pared down ad
ministrative structure. In place of the maze of fees required by the
-,
,

portant
"

See, e.,rs- . 3 1 CO'\G_ REc. 1 898 ( 1 898)
to

(statement of Rep. Bell) ( argui ng that i t i s im
protect local bankers and wholesale merchants) .

National banks do generally appear to have supported federal bankruptcy legislati o n .
But they d i d not figure in t h e debates in a n y significant way-their support was mixed. Thev
clearly were more concerned about uniform federal standards on commercial law issues than
they were wi th bankruptcy. For examples of bankers' views, see, for example, Proceedings of
the Com·ention ofthe American Bankers Association National Convention 85 (Aug. 1 3 , 1 880)
(statement by C. C. Bonney) ( argui ng that the "necessity of a National Bankruptcy Law is now
almost universally admitted") . B ut see icl. at 90-9 1 (statement of T.H . Hinchman) ( '' [The ]
history of bankrupt laws show them to have been very unj ust and unsatisL1c:tory, subjecting
both creditor and debtor to great unnecessary loss . " ) .
"
The highwater mark of this trend came i n 1 894, when a D emocrat-con trolled H o use
passed Senator Bailey's voluntary-only bankruptcy bill. See 26 Co;:-.;c. REC:. 7598 ( 1 894) . In
later years, these lawmakers rallied aroun d Senator Nelson 's bill, which in cluded onlv a l i m
i ted i nvolun tary bankruptcy option. The Nelson bill passed the Senate, but the i n\'Oluntary
provisions were tightened up in the conference with the H ouse, which had passed a version
of the Torrey Bill. See 31 CoNe. REc. 6296-97 ( 1 898) (statement of Sen. Nelso n ) ( co mparing
the two bills ) ; see also icl. at 6299 (Senate passes conference committee bill that reconciled
the two bills) .
'"

See, e.g., 28 CONG. REC. 4637 ( 1 896) (statement of Rep. Ray) (arguing that voluntary
only bill would destroy credit) .
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1 867 Act, the Lowell Bill called for a small group o f salaried officials
to oversee the process: assignees to act as truste e , registers to serve
in a j udicial capacity, and a group of regional supervisors to , as the
name suggested, oversee the process as a whole. 5 4 But even this
structure, which echoed in telling respects the approach that soon
gave way to officialism with the Bankruptcy Act of 1 88 3 in E ngland,55
was rej ected as too costly and intrusive . The progression is telling.
When the Lowell Bill was first introduced, Senator H o ar singled out
the proposal to compensate b ankruptcy officials o n a salary basis for
special praise. Paying the supervisors and commissioners a salary,
he argued, would eliminate any incentive to n ee dlessly complicate
or prolong a bankruptcy case .'"6 The Torrey revision of the bill, as
introduced in 1 890, not only did away with the proposal to appoint
overseers, but it also started a shift away from salaries and back to a
fee-based approach. s ; In the version that finally passed, the 1 89 8
Act provided only for referees a n d trustees, and b o th would be paid
strictly by fees. 58
A second important concession to debtors and federalism was
in the division of authority between federal and state lawmakers.
Every creditor proposal from the Lowell Bill simply incorporated
state law exemptions rather than imposing federal ones. This
clearly was not by choice. Creditors would have been m uch happier
to include uniform federal exemptions, thus nullifying the generous
exemptions of states such as Texas, but they recognized that federal
exemptions would be politically fatal ."') Creditors also made conces
sions to the state courts. Although the Lowell Bill had vested rela
tively expansive j urisdiction in the federal courts, creditors later
''
also id.

..
,,

See 13 CONG. REc. 5268-74 ( 1 882) (statement of Sen. H oar) (setting forth bill ) ;
at 5274-76 ( describing and defending bill) .

see

As noted earlier, the simi larities were not lost on lawmakers o pposed to the legisla
tion. See supra note 36. See also 15 CONG. REc:. 4308 ( 1 884) ( memorial of Louisville Board
of Trade) (stating that Lowell Bill was drawn from 1 86 7 Act and England ' s Bankruptcy Acts of
1861 and 1 869 ) .
"

See, e.g. ,

1 4 CO:\G. REc. 1 4 7 ( 1 88 2 ) (statement of Sen. Hoar)

.

.,, The Torrey Bill proposed to pay commissioners, whi c h were then called refe rees,
$ 1 000 plus a $ 1 0 fee for each case. See 21 CONG. REC. 7566-68 ( 1 890) (synopsis of Torrey
Bill)
.

.,, The 1 898 Act provided for referees to be paid $ 1 0 plus 1 % of di\iclencls paid. See
The Bankruptcy Act of 1 898, § 40, c h . 5 4 1 , 30 Stat. 544, 556. Trustee s received $5 plus speci
fied percentages of assets distributed. See id. at § 48, 30 Stat. at 557-58.
"

See Proceeding·s o f National Association o f Credit lvfen, S . Doc. No. 1 56, 55th Cong . ,
1 5 ( 1 898) (Torrey characterizes federal exemptions a s politically i n fe asibl e ) .
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agreed to revlSlons that required trustees to bring preference and
fraudulent conveyance actions in the local state courts . 60
In the third area, involuntary ban kruptcy and the scope of a
debtor's discharge , creditors dug i n their heels much more strongly.
Against opponents' claims that struggling debtors would be thrown
into bankruptcy by malicious creditors, the creditors' advocates in
sisted that creditors had no incentive to wrongfully invoke bank
ruptcy proceedings and that only with involun tary bankruptcy
would creditors be assured a fair share of debtors' assets. Although
creditors succeeded both in retaining involun tary bankruptcy, and
in precluding discharge from debtors who committed fraud, they
also made several important concessions. Unlike under the 1 867
Act, a creditor vote would not be required as a prerequisite to dis
charge.61 To protect against malicious or mistaken involuntary peti
tions, several safeguards were added during the course of the de
bates: the final bill required creditors to post a bond when they filed
an involuntary petition; raised the minimum debt requirement to
$ 1000; guaranteed the debtor a trial by jury; and weakened the pro
visions that authorized the court to detain a debtor.62 In the ex
traordin ary negotiations that produced the final bill, creditors also
agreed to eliminate several of the "acts of bankruptcy" that j ustified
th e filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition . 53
It took still more for the 1 898 Act to pass. By 1 898, the eco
nomic downturn that began earlier in the decade had lasted so long
"
'
See 14 CO"iG. REC. 1 69-1 70 ( 1 882) (statement of Sen. H oar) ( proposi ng successfully
amendment to require that suits by assignees be brought i n state court) ; Bankruptcy Act of
1 898, § 2 3 ( b ) , ch. 54 1 , 30 Stat. 544, 552 ( requiring trustees to bring suit "in the courts where
the bankrupt . . . might have brought or prosecuted them " ) . This requireme n t quickly be
came a point of conte n tion after the 1 898 Act passed, as l awyers and referees complai ned bit
terly about the cost and inconveni ence of having to bring l i tigation in state court.
"1

This concession appeared as early as the Lowell Bill and remained i n place through
the e n tire course of the debates. See 1 3 COl\G. REc. 5 268-74 ( 1 882) (setting out bill, i nclud
i ng discharge requirements in § 82) .
•,

See Bankruptcy Act of 1 898, § 3 (e ) , c h . 5 4 1 , 30 Stat. 544, 547 ( bond requirement) ;
§ 1 9 , 30 Stat. at 5 5 1 ( trial by jmy on issue of insolvency ) ; § 9, 30 Stat. at 549 ( l i miting power to
arrest bankrupts and authorizing detention if bankrupt is about to leave district) . Each of
these provisions generated substantial discussion in the legislatiYe debates.
"'

As with much of the legislative debate, the conference committee that reconciled the
House ( Henderson ) and Senate ( Nelso n ) bills focused almost e n tirely on the grounds for
invol un tary bankruptcy (the "acts of bankruptcy") and the bases for denying discharge.
Three of the eight acts of bankruptcy were dropped in conference. An earlier con cession
had removed a very controversial ninth act of bankruptcy, which made failure for more than
thirty clays to make payments on commercial paper a basis for an i nvolu n tary filing. See 3 1
CO"iG. RE c 6297 ( 1 898) (statement o f Sen. Nelso n ) ( describing changes t o discharge ) .

336

BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS jOURNAL

[Vol. 15

that nearly everyone agreed on the n eed for som e kind of bank
rup tcy law. The creditors ' proposal might have lost out to a tempo
rary voluntary bill if the Republicans hadn ' t obtained control of
both Congress and the presidency in 1898. "4 But pass it did. And
from the struggle between creditors' groups and the forces of fed
eralism came the features that would typify Ameri can bankruptcy
law.';" In striking contrast to the tough , administrative British
framework that emerged at the same time, American ban kruptcy
would have a minimalist administrative structure and comparatively
generous provisions for the treatment and discharge of debtors.
IV.

AFTER THE ACT: THE BANKRUPTCY BAR

According to an old saw about negotiations, if both parties
complain about the outcome, the n egotiations probably were suc
cessful. By this standard, the 1898 Act splendidly reconciled the in
terests of business with the pressures of American federalism. What
to some was a law outrageously generous to debtors, others attacked
fi6
as a heartless creditor collection measure .
Despite these ( rather coun terin tui tive) signs of success, few o b
servers would have predicted with confidence that the 1 898 Act was
the one that would last. As with each of its predecessors, the 1898
Act faced an immediate legislative backlash. Opponents of the Act
mounted vigorous campaigns for more than a decade after its en
actment.67 Yet somehow the Act survived the onslaught. Much of
the genius of the 1898 Act lay in compromises we h ave seen. But
"'

Sec

Bradley Hansen ,

The Political Economy o fBankruptcy: The I 898 Act t o Establish

A Uniform System of Banknzptcy, ESSAYS IN ECO:\OMIC AND BCS!i\ESS H ISTO RY ( 1 99 7 )

(discussing t h e signifi cance of Republican con trol to passage of 1 898 Act) . A s n o ted earlier,
the bill that passed the Senate ( the Nelson Bill) had very restrictive requirements for i nvo lun
tary bankruptcy, and was favored by many lawmakers who insisted o n a voluntary-on l y bill.
,,., The bill that finally passed was a remarkably balanced c o mpromise between the
debtOr-friendly Senate Bill and the House Bill, which creditors preferred. The one dissenting
voice on the conference committee was Represen tative Terry, who was opposed to any bank
ruptcy law, and even he lauded the efforts of the conference committee. See 3 1 CONG. REc.
6429 ( 1 898) (statement of Rep . Terry) (stating that many of the b i l l ' s most o bjectionable fea
tures had been removed) .
'''

Compare Olmstead, supra n o te 1 8 ( criti cizing the bill as a n unprecedented 'jubilee"
for debtors) with H . REP. No. 4 3 9 7 ( 1 905) Uudiciary Committee Report calling for repeal o f
1 898 A c t because creditOrs are simply u s i n g i t for collection ) .
'·'

I n 1 905, the judiciary Committee issued a report calling for repeal, and a minori ty of
the Committee had reached the same conclusion in 1 902. See H . REP. N o . 4397, at 1 ( 1 905)
(majority calls for repeal) ; H. REP. No. 1 698, at 3 ( 1 90 2 ) ( m inority advocates repeal ) .
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the rest of its genius emerged only after the passage of th e Act in
1 89 8 . "R
One facto r in the Act's survival was simple party politics. Just as
Republican control had helped ensure passage of the Act in 1 898,
continued Republican control diminished the threat of repeal.
Under M cKinley and Roosevelt, the Republicans held the VVhite
House until 1 9 1 2; and their con trol extended to both houses of
Congress until the Democrats finally regained the House in 1 9 1 0 .
With the party that had advocated bankruptcy reform very much in
charge , repeal was much less likely than it would have been in an
era of Democratic ascendan cy.
It is important not to overstate the significan ce of Republican
control. Although bankruptcy had long been a Republican priority,
Republican s were not monolithically in favor of bankruptcy, as evi
denced by the vote for repeal by a Republican controlled Judiciary
Committee in 1 905.
Moreover, had Republican proponents
changed their minds about ban kruptcy, they wouldn ' t have been
the first m ajority party to do so. In 1 843, their predecessors , the
VVhig party, led the charge for repeal of th e bankruptcy law they
ti'l
had pushed through only two years earlier.
Rather than directly assuring the permanence of the 1898 Act,
the real significance of Republican control was transitional. It was
the ban kruptcy bar that added the final piece of the bankruptcy
puzzle, and Republican control made this possible . 70 To see how,
recall for a moment the pared down administrative structure of th e
1 898 Act. Unlike the British system , with its powerful administrator,
the 1 898 Act called for trustees and referees with limited powers;
the Act's fee-based compensation discouraged them from actively
intervening, since spending additional time on a case would only
make sense if it produced substantial n ew assets and thus additional
fees. 71 In theory, this minimalist structure left the process to the

"'

In another context, Jon Macey has described the role legislation plays i n shaping sub
sequent i n terest group support as the legislation ' s "ex ante wiring. " See Jonathan R. Macey,
Organiza tional Design and the Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECO:\. &
ORG. 93 ( 1 99 2) . The developments described below can be seen as a very similar phenome
non.
"'
For a discussion, see Skeel, s upra note 1 3 , at 503.
'" The discussion that follows draws from and expands on my discussion of the role of
the bankruptcy bar in Skeel, su pra n o te 1 3 .
" Fee-based compensation also may have discouraged referees from denying a debtor's
discharge, given that dismissing a debtor's peti ti o n would also sacrifice the referee's ability to
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parties themselves-that is, debtors and their creditors. The more
immediate reality, however, was that it created an urgen t need for a
bankruptcy bar. With creditors and debtors j ousting over the pro
priety of bankruptcy and discharge , and the referee playing a
somewhat limited role, the one constant was that everyon e n eeded a
lawyer.n
Because there h ad not been a federal bankruptcy law in place
for two decades, the b ankruptcy bar did not even exist when Presi
dent M cKinley signed the n ew legislation into law i n 1 898. This is
where Republican control proved especially important. Republican
control kept the 1 898 Act in place long enough for the bankruptcy
bar to get on its feet. By the time the Republicans finally slipped
-3
from power after 1 9 1 0, ' the b an kruptcy referees and b ar that owed
their existence to the Act were now in a position to h elp make sure
that the Act was not repealed.
Perhaps the best evidence of the growing influence of the bar is
in the legislative hearings on ban kruptcy in the first decade of the
century. Although Congress continued to debate whether the Act
should stay or go,74 leading members of the ban kruptcy bar such as
Edwin Brandenburg and Frank Remington played an increasingly
prominent role as sources of expertise . 75 The credibility they
(Remington especially) developed through repeated appearances
before the Judiciary Committee gave them parti cular influence on
technical issues and, over time, reduced the likelihood that the Ju
diciary Committee would call on Congress to repeal the Act. 76

look to the estate for fees.
" A few lawmakers commente d on the demand for lawyers that the p roposed legislatio n
would create. B u t most of the comme n ts were simply off-handed attacks o n t h e legislati o n as
a whole. See, e.g., 28 CONG. REc. 4752 ( 1 896) (statement of Rep. Talbert) .
" The D emocrats took control of the House in 1 9 1 0. It was n o t u n ti l 1 9 1 2, when
vVoodrmv vVilson won the presidency, that the balance of power truly shifted i n a Democratic
directio n .
"
An ongoing concern for proponents of bankruptcy was that their efforts to secure
minor amendments to the Act would boomerang and lead to a movem e n t to repeal the legis
lation altogether. The fear was legitimate, as the advocates of repeal m o b i lized each time
Congress considered amendments . See, e.g., 35 COl': C . REc:. 6957-58 ( 1 90 2 ) ( proposed
amendment that would simply repeal the Act failed) .
"
Brandenburg wrote the first complete treatise on the new Bankruptcy Act, and Rem
ington followed with a similarly complete treatise thereafter. See EDWIN BRA'\DE:\BCRC,
BR\:-JDE:\BL'RC ON BANKRUPTCY

( 1 89 8 ) ;

FR\NK RE:V! I'\GTO N ,

REY!INGTO'\ ON R\N KRUPTC:Y

( 1 908) .

'"

In the early years of the Act, Rem i ngton appeared at nearly every Judiciary Com m i t
tee hearing. Bv the end of the first decade, he ofte n acted as de fac to bankruptcy expert, i n-
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In addition to individual representatives, bankruptcy referees
figured prominently in the lobbying process,;; and the bankruptcy
bar exerted influence through organizations such as the Commer
cial Law League and the American Bar Association .;s Their princi
pal organized ally was the National Association of Credit Men, most
of whose members worked in firms' credit departments and which
was a successor of sorts to the business groups that had originally
lobbied for the 1 898 Act.;9 These organizations worked together so
closely, and over so many years, that they eventually formalized their
relationship by forming the National Bankruptcy Conference in the
early years of the New Deal.80
The longterm effect of the emergence of a stable bankruptcy
bar was to solidify the coalition in favor of a permanent bankruptcy
law. Even with continued creditor support and important conces
sions to the proponents of debtors' interests, the future of the 1 89 8
Act was uncertain for well over a decade. With each passing year,
however, the stake of ban kruptcy lawyers and referees in its contin
ued existence increased, as did their ability to contribute to that
goal . Over time, the bankruptcy bar would become the single most
important influence on the evolution of U . S. bankruptcy law. Law
ye rs have assured that U.S. bankruptcy practice will continue to be
dominated by the parties and their lawyers, rather than a governterjecting repeatedly to clarifY fi ne points about bankruptcy law.

See, e.g., Hearings Before

the S u bcommiuee of the Committee on the judiciary, United States Senate, on the Bill I-I.R.

20575, 6 1 st Cong., 8 ( 1 9 1 0) (statement of H arol d Rem ingto n ) (characterizing proposed
amendments as si mply effectuating the original i n tent of the 1 903 amendments ) .
"

.

See, e.g., 43 C o N e REC. 2006 ( 1 909) (statem e n t of Rep . Sherley) (defending refe
rees' support for bankruptcy amendments ) .

" The Commercial Law League was formed in 1 895 by a group of commercial lawyers.
For a description of the CLLA's early h istory, see MORRIS WEISMAN, A HISTORY OF THE
C O M M ERC IAL L\W LEAGUE OF A,v JERIC.-'1. 1-5 ( 1 976) . Although the League was concerned with
a variety of commercial law issues ( including the movemen t for uniform commercial laws) ,
bankruptcy quickly became a dominant concern. The American Bar Association elated back
to 1 878, and took positions on a wide range of legal issues. The bar exerted influence
through the Committee on Commercial Law, whose j urisdiction included bankruptcy.
''' The NACM was formed in 1 896. Most of i ts members came from the credit depart
ments of business firms.
"' The NACM, CLLA, and ABA, along with a group of law professors and bankru p tcy
lawvers, formed the 1'\ational Bankruptcy Conference in 1 934 in an effort to address a wide
range of issues (many of them technical in nature) that they felt had been n eglecte d in the
early New D eal reforms. The National Bankruptcy Conference had an enormous i n fluence
over the shape of the Chandler Act of 1 938. For a brief overview by one of its most pro mi
nent members. see Reuben H unt, The Progress of the Chandler Bankruptcy Bill, 42 C0'\1 . L J .
1 95 ( 1 937)
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mental official, by thwarting proposals ( most prominently, i n the
1 9 30s and again in the 1 970s) to introduce an English-style gov
ernmental overseer. They also have continually pushed to expand
the scope of the bankruptcy laws.81
The influence of the general bankruptcy bar stands in striking
contrast to the corporate reorganization bar that h ad emerged in
the late nineteenth century. The reorganization bar was called into
existence by the waves of railroad failures in the 1 870s and thereaf
ter. Unlike the general bankruptcy bar, which was far from elite
(and in fact, was often controversial due to allegations of bank
ruptcy "rings") , the reorganization bar included m any of the most
prominent members of the greatest New York law firms.H2 Yet, when
the New Deal reformers overhauled the bankruptcy laws i n the
1 930s, it was the reorganization bar that they destroyed . The gen
eral bankruptcy bar was not only protected, but i n some respects
expanded its turf. Centered on Wall Street, corporate reorganiza
tion practice fell prey to the wave of anti-Wall Street bias unleashe d
during the New Deal .8� Thanks t o the much more broad-based
bankruptcy bar, and the concessions already made to debtor inter
ests, the 1 898 Act survived the regulatory impulses of the New D eal .
V.

CONCLUSION

If we compare the U . S . ban kruptcy laws to those of the nation ' s
original sovereign, England, the contrast could h ardly b e starker.
Unlike the heavily administrative English system, U . S . bankruptcy
law is driven by private parties and their lawyers; the English system
discourages filing and discharge, whereas the U . S . system ten ds to

'1

See Skeel , supra n o te 1 3. There is an obvious analogy b e tween bankruptcy lawyers'
influence over bankruptcy law and the l iterature exploring agency b ureaucrats' role i n pro
tectin g and expanding their agency. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. NISKANE N , BU REAUCRACY AND
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT ( 1 9 7 1 ) ( emphasizing agencies' i n c e ntive to maximize their
budgets) ; William A. Niskan e n , A Reflection o n Bureaucracy a n d Representative Govern
ment, in THE BlJDGET-MAXIMIZING BU REAUCRA.T: APPRAISALS AND EVIDENCE (Andre Blais &
Stephanie Dion, eels . , 1 99 1 ) (revising earlier analysis) .

'' The best known example is Paul Cravath , the namesake of Cravath, Swaine & Moore.
His similarly prominent successor, Robert Swaine, chronicled the firm ' s rise and i ts extensi\·e
i nvolvement in early reorganization practice in ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM A:\D
ITS PREDECESSORS:
'1

1 8 1 9- 1 947 ( 1 9 46-48) .

For an extensive discussion of the effe c t of the New Deal reforms o n corporate reor
ganization and the reorganization bar, see David A. Skeel, Jr. , An Evolutionary Theoq of
Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 5 1 VAND . L . REV . 1 325, 1 36 1 -72 ( 1 998) .
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encourage them.
The year that will forever be associated with the distinctive U . S .
sys tem i s 1 898. That was the year Congress enacted the Bankruptcy
Act of 1 898, which ended a century of instability and made federal
ban kruptcy law a permanent fixture on the legislative landscape.
This Article contends that the "genius" of the 1 898 Act can be
explained by a small group of political factors. The rise of business
organizations at the end of the nineteenth century provided the
impetus, and the Act was shaped by the interaction of these credi
tors' interests and the countervailing pressures of American federal
ism . Thanks to a lengthy period of Republican control, the Act re
mained in place long enough to spawn a bankruptcy bar. The b ar
then solidified the coalition supporting the Act.
In retrospect, the forces that came together in 1 898 h ave so
great an air of n ecessity that it seems hard to imagine bankruptcy
law taking any o ther form than the approach that finally passed.
Perhaps economic expansion plus the American political frame
work led inescapably to a lawyer-driven ban kruptcy framework
rather than an administrative one, but perhaps not. Had insolvency
remained the province of the states until the New Deal,84 for in
stan ce, one could imagine the New Deal reformers devising an ad
ministrative approach to bankruptcy-possibly tied to administrative
reforms such as welfare and social security.
Speculation of this sort is, of course, j ust that-speculation .
The important point i s that, a t the centennial o f the 1 89 8 Act's en
actment, we now can see much more clearly than the Act's creators
just how special the bankruptcy legislation was. What made the Act
special was a unique combination of creditors, American federalism
and, as always in the United States, the lawyers that soon followed .

''

If t h e Supreme Court had concluded i n 1 902 that t h e Act's incorporation of state l aw
exemptions was unconstitutionally nonuniform , the possibil i ty of repeal would have been far
greater than i t proved to be. As i t was, the Court upheld this key compromise with advocates
of state regulation. See Hanover Nat'! Bank v. Moyses, 1 86 U.S. 1 8 1 , 1 88 ( 1 902) ( holding that
uniformity requires only geographi cal, not personal, uniformity) .

